



EXPLAINING DOCTRINES OF INDONESIA'S ISLAMIC ORGANIZATION OF NAHDLATUL ULAMA (NU) FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF ISLAMIC RADICAL GROUPS

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It should be recognized that the greatest mass organizations in Indonesia such as NU, Muhammadiyah, Persis and others be survived because of their strong ideological construction. Thus, the question that is trying to answer in this paper, in between the Islamic-based parties and mass organizations in Indonesia, which of those have closest ideology to Islamic radical groups such as ISIS? By using theological and Political of theoretical framework it will be found that NU is an Islamic organizations of moderate, tolerant and egalitarian, a precious wealth of the nation and Islam in Indonesia. In the presence of this organization, the state does not face significant obstacles in articulating Islam in private and public life (politics). The organizations are also able to reduce the political and religious conflicts, as happened in other places. Unlike the situation of society in the Middle East that are still struggling with political and religious conflicts as results from the proliferation of extremist groups such as ISIS. It could be, the Middle East experienced a protracted conflict because they do not have mass organization of moderate and tolerant such as NU or Muhammadiyah.

Keyword: *NU; Nusantara's Islam, Ideology; Radical Groups*

Introduction

It must be recognized that currently there were still problems in the Islamic community (ummah) that need to be resolved. We could not to ask for forgiveness in dealing with these situations. As we found that there is a real situation of violence committed by a small fraction of Muslims. For example a suicide bomb attack that the world community called it a "terrorist attack" carried out against people who are not guilty, in which the victims included Muslims as well.

This is very unfortunate where the whole world witnessed how a Muslim to kill another Muslim. For example sectarian violence involving Sunni-Shiite conflict. Muslim leaders around the world should start talking about the universal message of Islam. Differences of opinion should be accepted by experts in peaceful surroundings and family, eliminating the need for violence and murder among fellow Muslims themselves. However Muslims are supposed to be responsible to resolve this conflict without bloodshed.

Whereas, before the arrival of the fundamentalists and terrorists groups, the doctrine that generally shared by Muslims are moderate and polite, like the doctrine of Aswaja by Nahdlatul Ulama in Indonesia. This is what will be explained in this paper. How NU's moderate teachings viewed from the perspective of the doctrine of radical Islamists groups such as ISIS. So, it would seem the urgency of maintaining Aswaja's ideology as a solution to resolve the conflicts and establish peace in the world.

Takfiri Jihadis as Root of Radicalism and Terrorism

Ahmad Moussalli said that Salafism is a very diversified and complicated ideologically and religiously motivated trend and is thus not constructed by one unified discourse or group

or authority. As a rule, all Wahhabis are salafists, but not all salafists are Wahhabis. Islamism is also another complex trend that includes moderate and radical movements, but it is not equivalent to Wahhabism: it is actually its antithesis. While Islamism and Wahhabism/salafism share a few theological and intellectual doctrines, they are theologically and politically very different. However, after September 11, 2001 and the invasion of Iraq, some Wahhabis and salafists merged together with radical Islamists and consequently have created neo-salafism and takfiri-jihadism, as well as al-Qaeda and ISIS.¹ This complexity thus appears in the takfiri-jihadists that are composed of both neo- Wahhabis, neo-salafists, and radical Islamists.

Again, not all takfiris are jihadist, and not all jihadists are takfiri. To understand these seemingly similar yet very complex religious, ideological, and political manifestations, the essay explains separately each ideology, outlines the basic discourse of their trend, and then shows in a comparative manner the similar and different principles and interpretations. The conclusion first shows how these trends and their movements and groups are manipulated by different governmental and non-governmental powers and, second, draws up the profiles of neo-salafist, neo-Wahhabi, and takfiri-jihadist and their practical impacts on the politics of the world today.²

Mostly, Takfirism in modern era is Wahhabism. Wahhabis -- who claim to be the champion of Sunni Islam -- perceive the Sunnis as having been wrong for over ten centuries and have been living a state of pre-Islamic paganism (jahiliyya [literally,

¹ Ahmad Moussalli, *Wahhabism, Salafism and Islamism: Who Is The Enemy?* Journal of American University of Beirut, (January, 2009), 4-5.

² Ahmad Moussalli, *Wahhabism, Salafism and Islamism: Who Is The Enemy?* 6.

ignorance]) since they moved away from the way of al-salaf.³ They even accused the majority of orthodox Sunni Muslims who were living under the Ottoman caliphate and the caliphate itself of reprehensible innovation (bid'a) and unbelief (kufr) because they had been living under a political system that is unknown to al-salaf.

Moreover, Abd al-Wahhab branded all Shiah as unbelievers and rafida (rejectionists); for their kufr is directly linked to their lack of faith. Baghdad's 'ulama' (religious scholars) criticized the Wahhabi theory that views all Muslims as polytheists and unbelievers. Consequently, it should be noted that takfir (excommunication) has been a prominent feature of Wahhabism in its original form and today in its neo-Wahhabi form.⁴

Unlike other sects of Muslims Wahhabis do not tolerate other sects and try to enforce their beliefs to other sunni Muslims and shia Muslims even with using terror and bombing and simply call any Muslim who not agree their beliefs Mushrik and allow killing him and taking his family and property.

Ibn Baz⁵ issued a statement faulting the memo's style and calling for obedience to the leaders and for giving advice inside

³ To retrieve the pious precursors of Islam al-Salaf al-Salih, Abd al-Wahhab proposed replacing the barbarous and "infidel" customs by full implementation of shari'a, the Wahhabites describing themselves as muwahhidun – unitarists.

⁴ Ahmad Moussalli, *Wahhabism, Salafism and Islamism: Who Is The Enemy?* 7.

⁵ Ibn Baz was a Saudi Arabian Islamic scholar and a leading proponent of the Salafi form of Islam. He was the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia from 1993 until his death in 1999. According to French political scientist Gilles Kepel, Baz was a "figurehead for institutional Wahhabism" whose "immense religious erudition and his reputation for

the privacy of the house. The authorities arrested many of the groups' followers, some of whom were set free in exchange for their promise to cease all actions. On the other side, Muhammad al-Mas'ari fled the Saudi Arabia and found refuge in London where he established the Salafists' first public tribune. In a later stage, this group was divided into three wings: 1) the Sa'd al-Faqih wing, representing the Brotherhood's line, 2) the Muhammad al-Mas'ari wing, forming the Legal Rights Committee in London, 3) the Osama Bin Laden wing, calling for revolutionary opposition.

The last wing extended its Wahhabi popular bases, especially among the Arab Afghans who had helped liberate Afghanistan from the Soviet occupation. Thousands of mujahidin returned to their country, only to discover that "The Land of the Two Sanctuaries" was directly under occupation by the Americans. Bin Laden sent an open letter to the Saudi government in 1997, explaining the frustration felt by that group of the Wahhabi opposition. The letter became the foundational letter on whose grounds the revolutionary armed movement, the neo-Wahhabi/neo-salafist al-Qaida organization, was born.⁶

With the establishment of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Wahhabism gained new ground and was used as the official basis for determining laws and conduct in Saudi society. Wahhabism is the basis for practices such as the segregation of

intransigence" gave him prestige among the population of Saudi Arabia and he "could reinforce the Saud family's policies through his influence with the masses of believers", and his death left the government without a comparable figure from within the Wahhabite clergy to "fill" his "shoes".

⁶ Daniel Ungueanu, *Wahhabism, Salafism and the Expansion of Islamic Fundamentalist Ideology*, Al.I. Cuza" University of Iasi. (Romania) 2008, 141.

the sexes, the prohibition of the sale and consumption of alcohol, a ban on women driving, and numerous other social restrictions. Wahhabism also has shaped the Saudi educational structure, and Saudi schoolbooks generally denounce teachings that do not conform to Wahhabist beliefs. The puritanical and iconoclastic philosophies reflected in this sect historically have resulted in conflict with other Muslim groups. Wahhabism opposes most popular religious practices such as saint veneration, the celebration of the Prophet's birthday, and practices associated with the mystical teachings of Sufism. In September 2005, the State Department again designated Saudi Arabia as a "Country of Particular Concern" under the International Religious Freedom Act "for particularly severe violations of religious freedom." According to the State Department's 2005 International Religious Freedom Report on Saudi Arabia, in spite of efforts by some senior Saudi government officials to promote tolerance of other religions and steps to remove some intolerant material from textbooks, members of the Shi'a Muslim minority continue "to face political and economic discrimination," and non-Muslim groups are not granted freedom of worship, whether public or private.⁷

Extremist Groups Ideology

After al-Qaeda, ISIS is an ultra-radical group that emerged in Iraq in early 2013. The group considers infidels (kafir) all which do not join the group, regarded as infidels all which do not want to support the concept of an Islamic state and does not want to pledge allegiance to the caliph which they appoint. Any person who does not pledge allegiance to ISIS and its leaders

⁷ Christopher M. Blanchard, *The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya*, CRS Report for Congress, January 25, 2006, 2-3.

should be killed. ISIS also forbids democracy, elections, and the election of the President. They hostile to all leaders who are not applying the law of God –based understanding of them hating nationalists, Islamist groups which not of their group and forbid all state institutions. That's some ideological concepts constructed by ISIS.⁸

ISIS essentially was an organization born from a group of al-Qaeda. Just as al-Qaeda, ISIS is an Islamic group that embraces the ideology of “takfir”. However, ISIS is more radical when it considers all other entities as infidels and must be eliminated. The group of al- Qaeda itself has ideological roots from “salafi jihadis” and “salafi Wahhabism”. As claimed by Bernard Haykel from Princeton University that ISIS is the manifestation of Wahhabism ideology.⁹

Salafi Wahhabism is a theological movement of Sunni Islam which concentrated on the purification of faith and eradication of the practice of polytheism or heresy (bid’ah).¹⁰ Wahhabism is the theological stream adopted by the leaders of

⁸ See detail in Najih Ibrahim and Hisyam al-Najjar, *al-Daulah al-Islamiyyah bi al-Iraq wa al-Syam: al- Sikkin allazi Tazbah al-Islam* (Kairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 2014).

⁹Jim Eckman, “Understanding ISIS: Its Origins, Its Ideology and Its Context”, in <https://graceuniversity.edu/iip/2014/10/understanding-isis-its-origins-its-ideology-and-its-context/>. Accessed 5 July 2015.

¹⁰ Wahhabism is a primarily theological movement in Sunni Islam concerned with purifying the faith. Salafi focuses on eliminating idolatry (shirik) and affirming God’s Oneness (tawhid). A distinctive Salafi intellectual genealogy extends to medieval times. The writings of the Syrian Hanbali scholar Ibn Taimiyya (d. 1328) and his students provide the core Salafi theological corpus. Later significant Salafi thinkers came from the Wahhabi movement, or Wahhabism, a subset of Salafism founded in the Arabian Peninsula by Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (d. 1792). In the late 18th century Wahhabism was wedded to the Saudi political establishment and remains so today.

ISIS, including Abu Omar al- Bagdadi and Abu Bakr al-Bagdadi. These leaders have a strong commitment to the Wahhabi doctrine. As written by Jim Eckman, circulation of a video that shows the Wahhabi symbol in the center office of al-Bagdadi shows that this group adopted the Wahhabi religious ideology.¹¹ Historically, Wahhabism developed a doctrine that considers pagan people who do not adopts monotheism, and infidels was considered necessary to be killed in order to purify the Muslim community.

The same case happens in ISIS when the current official spokesman of the Islamic State, Abu Muhammad al-'Adnani, even taught the writings of Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab to fellow jihadis. A Vice News documentary of the Islamic State from August 2014 showed an official preaching van in Raqqa, Syria plastered with Wahhabi catechisms. Some Islamic State official publications are little more than long quotations from Wahhabi scholars. Although in different forms, takfir ideology and hostility has been widely implemented by al-Qaeda and ISIS today.

Wahhabism is then developed into salafi jihadis, although not all groups supporting salafi jihadi ideology. Initially, the Salafist movement focused on religious studies and the winning of hearts and minds (dakwah) as a way of creating an Islamic society and a state ruled by Islamic law. However, within the Salafi movement an extremist faction called Salafiyya Jihadiyya developed, from which Al-Qaeda and the global jihad organizations, including ISIS, have emerged. An ideologically important contribution to the development of the movement was made by Sayyid Qutb, an Egyptian ideologue whose ideas inspired the establishment of Islamic organizations that

¹¹ Jim Eckman, "Understanding ISIS: Its Origins, Its Ideology and Its Context", in <https://graceuniversity.edu/iip/2014/10/understanding-isis-its-origins-its-ideology-and-its-context/>. Accessed 5 July 2015.

supported violent struggle (including the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, led by Ayman al-Zawahiri, Bin Laden's successor as leader of Al-Qaeda), as mentioned before.

From a Salafist-jihadi perspective, Muslims must strive to disseminate and implement Islam in all areas of life by liberating the lands of Islam from other cultures especially Western culture through jihad (holy war), which is perceived as the personal duty of every Muslim. Thus Muslim must fight the enemies of Islam through violent and uncompromising military struggle. Moreover, according to the Salafist-jihadi perception, the enemies of Islam are not only external -mainly the US and the West, but also Arab regimes that cooperate with the West or secular Arab regimes that are considered infidel (kafir). Therefore, according to Salafist jihadists, Islamic religious law justifies overthrowing them.¹² The Islamic State's (ISIS) adoption of this acutely severe version of Jihadi Salafism is attributable to Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi,¹³ the founder of al-Qaeda in Iraq who studied theology with the prominent jihadi scholar Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi.¹⁴ The first leaders of the

¹² Cole Bunzel, "From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State", The Brookings Project on U.S. Relation with the Islamic World (No. 19, 2015), 8-9.

¹³ Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq from 2004 to 2006. He is 'Aḥmad Faḍīl an-Nazāl al-Ḥalāyla) was a militant Islamist from Jordan who ran a pramilitary training camp in Afghanistan. He became known after going to Iraq and being responsible for a series of bombings, beheadings, and attacks during the Iraq War.

¹⁴ Abu Muhammad Aasim al-Maqdisi is the assumed name of Aasim Muhammad Tahir al-Barqawi, a Salafi jihadi Islamist Jordanian-Palestinian writer. He is best known as the spiritual mentor of Jordanian mujahid Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the initial leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq. However, an ideological and methodical split emerged between Maqdisi and Zarqawi in 2004 due to Zarqawi's takfeer proclamations towards the Shi'a populations in Iraq. Maqdisi opted for a more cautious approach

Islamic State, Abu Umar al-Baghdadi¹⁵ and Abu Hamza al-Muhajir,¹⁶ were likewise Jihadi-Salafi stalwarts. Their speeches drew extensively on established Salafi authorities, many of them from the Wahhabi tradition.

The ideology of ISIS is that of Salafist-jihadism. It is important to remember that for them there is no distinction between religion and state. All decisions are based on a hardline interpretation of sharia (Islamic law), which is brutally enforced in the areas controlled by the Islamic State.¹⁷ It is also called as an Islamic holistic ideology derived from the religious texts.

In spite from the influence of Wahhabi and Salafi jihadist doctrine, ISIS has a number of more extreme doctrines. The most prominent of these stipulate: all Muslims must associate exclusively with fellow “true” Muslims and dissociate from anyone not fitting this narrow definition; failure to rule in accordance with God’s law constitutes unbelief; fighting the

towards targeted Shi'a killings, attempting to stop Zarqawi's radical ideological movement before Zarqawi's methods become counter-productive.

¹⁵ Abu Omar al-Baghdadi most commonly known as Abu Abdullah al-Rashid al-Baghdadi Leader of the Islamic State of Iraq and Mujahideen Shura Council to 2010. Very little is known about al-Baghdadi. It is stated that he may have served with the former Iraqi army as an officer during the Ba'athist regime of Saddam Hussein.

¹⁶ His name Abu Ayyub al-Masri leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq from 2006 to 2010, born in Egypt, he joined the Muslim Brotherhood and, according to General Caldwell, joined Ayman al-Zawahiri's Egyptian Islamic Jihad in 1982, where he "worked with Zawahiri." Al-Masri went to bin Laden's al-Farouk camp in Afghanistan in 1999, where he became an expert with explosives, especially truck bombs and roadside bombs like those currently used in Iraq.

¹⁷ Elliot Friedland, “The Islamic State”, The Clarion Project: Challenging Extremism Promoting Dialogue, (May 2015), 13.

Islamic State is tantamount to apostasy; all Shi'a Muslims are apostates deserving of death; and the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas are traitors against Islam, among many other things. Importantly, the Islamic State anchors these concepts in traditional Salafi literature, and is more dogmatic about their application than al-Qaeda.¹⁸

It should be noted that although the al-Qeda and ISIS embrace the same ideological doctrine, but differ in the strategy of Jihad. Al-Qaeda still adhered to "defensive jihad" while ISIS embraced "offensive jihad". Said by Fawaz A. Gerges, "offensive Jihad" carried by ISIS is a "total war" a war without knowing konpromi. It disdains arbitration or compromise, even with Sunni Islamist rivals. Unlike al-Qaeda Central, it does not rely on theology to justify its actions. "The only law I subscribe to is the law of the jungle," retorted Baghdadi's second-incommand and right-hand man, Abu Muhammed The weakest link of ISIS as a social movement is its poverty of ideas. ISIS and the Third Wave of Jihadism al-Adnani, to a request more than a year ago by rival militant Islamists in Syria who called for ISIS to submit to a Sharia court so that a dispute with other factions could be properly adjudicated. For the top ideologues of Salafi jihadism, such statements and actions are sacrilegious, "smearing the reputation" of the global jihadist movement, in the words of Abu Mohammed al- Maqdisi, a Jordan-based mentor to Zarqawi and many jihadists worldwide.¹⁹

¹⁸ Cole Bunzel, "From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State", 10.

¹⁹ Fawaz A. Gerges, "ISIS and the Third Wafe of Jihadism" 340-341.

Nahdlatul Ulama (NU): Moderate Islam and Nationalist

Established on 31 January 1926 in Surabaya, East Java, by some prominent kyais like K.H. Abdul Wahab Hasbullah and K.H. Hasyim Asy'ari, the Nahdlatul Ulama was born in the culture of pesantren where traditional Islam has been rooted and preserved. In this context, the Nahdlatul Ulama declared its religious ideology as "ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamaah". This religious ideology has become important characteristics of the Nahdlatul Ulama that differentiate itself from Muslim modernist organizations. In its early movements, the Nahdlatul Ulama played a pivotal role by, for example, banning the Muslim youths from entering the Dutch military service, prohibiting the Muslims from supporting the Dutch army, and rejecting the Dutch aid which was offered to the Nahdlatul Ulamas madrasas. Furthermore, together with other nationalist movements, the Nahdlatul Ulama actively took part in the process of establishing the Indonesian State and in the war to defend the Indonesian independence against the Dutch who tried to re-establish their colonial rule in Indonesia. These facts, undoubtedly, proved that the Nahdlatul Ulama made a great contribution to the nation and state of Indonesia.²⁰

NU today has a membership of more than 50 million. Founded as a critical reaction to the growth of Indonesia's Wahhabi reformist and modernist groups, which were attempting to shrink Indonesian Muslim, practices of locally inspired religious traditions, cultures, and knowledge, NU developed a reputation as the guardian of traditions – both classical Islamic traditions of knowledge, and local traditions and cultures. Accordingly, NU has been dubbed a

²⁰ Faisal Ismail, The Nahdlatul Ulama Its Early History and Contribution to the Establishment of Indonesian State, *Journal of Indonesian Islam*; (Vol. 5, Number 02, December 2011). 5.

“traditionalist Islamic organization”—a label that can be easily misconstrued. Indeed, NU serves as one of Indonesia’s leading Muslim institutions dedicated to the protection and attainment not only of traditional values and practices of Islam, but also citizenship, democratic civility, inter-group conciliation, religious tolerance, and the public good. In this regard, NU is traditional and modern, conservative and progressive alike.²¹

Nahdatul Ulama follows the ideology of *Ahl as-Sunna Wa al-Jama'ah*, which takes the middle sect between extreme *aqli* (rationalist) with the extreme *naqli* (scripturalist). Because it is a source of ideas for not only the Quran, the Sunnah, but also the ability of the mind coupled with empirical reality. It referred to this way of thinking of earlier thinkers, such as Abu al-Hasan al-Ash'ari and Abu Mansur Al-Maturidi in theology. Then in the following four schools of jurisprudence; Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, and Hanbali. While in the field of Sufism, it follows path of Al-Ghazali and Junaid al-Baghdadi.[8] It has been described by the media as a progressive, liberal and pluralistic Islamic movement.²²

In this contex Abdurrahman Mas'ud, Historically, expressed that one of features of modern Muslim in Indonesia in its development is that they cannot be separated from the existence of several previous Islamic organizations such as Sjarekat Dagang Islam (1909), Sjarekat Islam (1911), Muhammadiyah (1912), Thawalib (1918), and Nahdlatul Ulama (1926). After one century, NU and Muhammadiyah are two organizations dominantly give Islamic values in Indonesia. Those Islamic organizations have a good vision to reach: firstly,

²¹ A brief introduction of NU completely explored in Soeleiman Fadeli and Mohammad Subhan *Ontologi NU* (Surabaya: Khalista), 2010.

²² See ini Sirajuddin Abbas, *I'tiqad Ahlussunnah Wal Jamaah* (Jakarta: Pustaka Tarbiah, tt).


developing the existence of Islamic teachings, and secondly, empowering and accompanying society.²³

The interesting point of further development is searching for a model of accompanying and empowering society in NU and Muhammadiyah designed from prior of twentieth century. The model of assistance conducted by these organizations has already colored the diversity movement and socio-politic in our nation. After more than one century, it is necessary to study the model of movement developing recently, related to the development of conflict resolution either in NU or Muhammadiyah. At the beginning of their establishment, the programs of these organizations were focused on the efforts to defend local tradition and to diminish tradition containing forbidden teachings in society. In this context, NU has appreciated more to such local tradition and culture, while Muhammadiyah with its purity teaching to hold on Qur'an and Hadist has been opposed to any traditional values against to those sources. Beside at the prior development, the religious thoughts of NU and Muhammadiyah were oriented to fiqh, aqidah, tafsir, and hadist that were mostly related todogmatic teaching.

According to Abd. Halim, NU translates in political life according to the principle of understanding Aswaja, as outlined in the Basic Principles of Social Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), namely; First, the principle of perpendicular (i'tidal), put everything in place proportionally. Secondly, the principle of moderate (tawassuth), with this basic attitude will always be a group of peers who behave and act straight and always be constructive and avoid any kind of approach that is extreme. Third, the principle of balance (tawazun) is a principle that is emphasized

²³ Abdurrahman Mas'ud, Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, Two of Indonesia's Muslim Giants: Tension Within Intimacy (Harmony) Jurnal Multikultural & Multireligius Vol. IX, Nomr 34, 15.

by the teachings of Islam in order structuring society and a good social life. Fourth, the principle of tolerance (tasamuh) as a gesture of giving a chance or opportunity to the other party, according to basic human rights in general. There must be a guarantee that the strong parties, both the leader and the majority party, willing to make sacrifices to support the welfare and rights of poor people or minorities. Fifth, the principle of the general welfare (mashlahah 'ammah) internalized by NU requires the guarantee, the 5 (five) main points, namely, 1) freedom of religion, 2) guarantee the safety of life, 3) guarantee of freedom of thought and opinion, 4) guarantees the continuity heredity (family), and 5) a guarantee of assets/property.²⁴




²⁴ Abd. Halim, Aswaja In Frames Political Ideology and Democracy (Interpretation Asjawa in Eyes Politicians NU), Public Policy and Administration Research, (Vol.4, No.9, 2014). 4-7.

In Indonesia, the relationship between nationalism and Islam is very much different from what was in the Middle East. Since the founding of this country, the relationship between nationalism and Islam has been going well. It could have to be because of the founding fathers of religious scholars who are very nationalistic. Unlike the Middle East that is always banging on between nationalism and Islam. Such figures as Hos Clark Minoto, KH. Agus Salim, Natsir and the other are nationalist scholars, able to initiate Indonesian nationalism without aborting the role of religion. Thus was born the idea of Pancasila as a manifestation.²⁵

One of the Nusantara's ancient philosophy of *bhinneka tunggal ika* ("oneness amid diversity"), which later became an official national motto of Indonesia. This philosophy inspired the founding fathers of Indonesia to create the inclusive state ideology of Pancasila and the state constitution, UUD 1945. NU leaders such as Syaikh Hasyim Ash'ari, K.H. Wahab Chasbullah, K.H.A. Wahid Hasyim worked hand-in-hand with secular nationalists, both Muslims and non-Muslims, to create a public culture of citizenship and establish a political basis for a deeply plural society in the newly established nation-state of Indonesia. Embracing the ideology of Pancasila, they challenged reformist and Islamist aspirations of establishing an Islamic state in the country – a legacy that continues today through NU's defense of pluralism and the constitution.²⁶

²⁵ KH. Said Aqil Siraj ini his sppeech in International Summit of Moderate Islamic Leader (ISOMIL) from 9 to 11 May, 2016 in Jakarta, Indonesia.

²⁶ Sumanto al-Qurtuby, *Nahdlatul Ulama: Good Governance and Religious Tolerance in Indonesia*, <https://sites.nd.edu/contending-modernities/2013/01/15/nahdlatul-ulama-good-governance-and-religious-tolerance-in-indonesia/>. Accessed 12 Marc 2017.



Here is the declaration of NU's ulama on the relationship of Pancasila and Islam in 1983 in Situbondo, East Java.

Bismillahirrahmanirrahim

1. Pancasila sebagai dasar dan falsafah Negara Republik Indonesia bukanlah agama, tidak dapat menggantikan agama dan tidak dapat dipergunakan untuk menggantikan kedudukan agama.
2. Sila Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa sebagai dasar Negara Republik Indonesia menurut pasal 29 ayat (1) Undang-Undang Dasar 1945, yang menjiwai sila-sila yang lain, mencerminkan tauhid menurut pengertian keimanan dalam Islam.
3. Bagi Nahdlatul Ulama, Islam adalah akidah dan syari'ah, meliputi aspek hubungan manusia dengan Allah dan hubungan antar manusia.
4. Penerimaan dan pengamalan Pancasila merupakan perwujudan dari upaya ummat Islam Indonesia untuk

menjalankan syari'at agamanya.

5. Sebagai konsekwensi dari sikap di atas, Nahdlatul Ulama berkewajiban mengamankan pengertian yang benar tentang Pancasila dan Pengamalannya yang murni dan konsekwen oleh semua pihak.

(Sukorejo, Situbondo 16 Rabi'ul Awwal 1404 H (21 Desember 1983))

In addition, it can not be denied that the role of students is also very big in strengthening the ideology of Pancasila. Before independence, the founder of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) KH. Hasyim Ashari was able to burn the spirit of Indonesian nationalism in the fight against colonialism with slogan *Hubbul min Watan al-Iman* (love of the homeland as part of the Faith). This was not the hadith or Companions of the Prophet statements, but purely from KH. Hasyim Ashari who have had hardly fought for strengthening nationalism and Islam in Indonesia.

The Great Conclusion

Viewed from the above parameters, NU ideology greatly much even contrary to the ideology of fundamentalist as Salafism and Wahhabism and also to the extremist groups such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS. In terms of the hierarchy of understanding, NU and ISIS have absolutely no relevance. In NU's ideology, was not obtained ideology "takfir" who infidel groups that disagree with him. In ideology NU also was not obtained urge to do an open war against the West and America, or the ideology of hatred against the followers of other religions. On this basis, it is not erroneously to say that NU is a moderate Islamic group, tolerant and pro-peace. And most importantly, NU also did not adopt the ideology of the Islamic State (obligation to establish an Islamic state) as promoted by

al-Banna and Qutb, even support Pancasila as ideology the Republic of Indonesia.

Therefore, until recently, Islamic organizations like NU and Muhammadiyah able to keep the nation, Indonesia's Moslems and other religion, from the conflict between the ruling clerics or between Islamists with secular as in the Middle East, and led to prolonged conflict until today. We know, how many highly qualified scientific scholars in the Middle East such as Wahbah Zuhaili, Yusuf Qaradawi, Ahmad Tayeb and others, but the evidence that they are not able to become a reliever conflict as they failed to build nationalism nation.

Compare with contemporary scholars in Indonesia such as Said Aqil Siraj, Din Syamsuddin, Quraish Shihab and others, they are able to deliver peace for religious people in Indonesia because it not only serves as a Islamic scholar but also as a nationalist figure. They always encourage Islam profoundly respects all citizens irrespective of ethnic backgrounds and religions.

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